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EXPLORING THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 






Financial failures are always linked to issues of corporate governance (CG) as the latter is 
continuously perceived being the triggering factor for such fallout. Being inadvertently 
famous for its adverse effects, CG is also associated with, and has implications on, risk 
management (RM) practices of corporations. The global financial crisis in 2007 demonstrated 
the importance of CG and RM for banks as well as corporations and also highlighted the 
importance of the ethical formulation of such practices. 
One of the most profound traits of Islamic Banks (IBs) is its ethical foundation, and ethicality 
in contemporary times is not limited to the ethical nature of businesses but also the disclosure 
of activities as stipulated by international agencies. The disclosure approach is often used to 
validate information as communicated through mediums such as the banks’ Annual Reports 
(AR) to help improve the stakeholders’ understanding of the banks’ nature of businesses, 
current, and future plans, thus strengthening the banks' credibility. Ethicality is perceived as 
IBs’ trademark of which pertinent information for stakeholders and shareholders in the 
decision-making processes are to be revealed as required by the Islamic principles. In an 
attempt to contribute to the literature on corporate governance (CG) and risk management 
(RM), the disclosure approach is used to examine the relationship between them besides 
gauging the acceptance of the framework and practices while identifying the significant 
components that have the most influence on CG and RM.  
The paper aims at analysing the relationship between CG and RM disclosures through the 
information communicated in their ARs whereby the disclosure levels of these two variables 
are measured through disclosure analysis by developing specific indices for CG and RM. 
This paper, hence, aims to examine the correlation between CG and RM by identifying 
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disclosure levels within their individual dimensions. It is also an attempt to examine the type 
of correlation between CG and RM to identify whether there is a positive or negative 
relationship between the two. Furthermore, a regression analysis was conducted to locate the 
determinants of CG and RM disclosure performance in which individual index dimensions 
were considered as an independent variable. To achieve the stated aim, this study analyses 
153 annual reports (ARs) from 54 Islamic banks (IBs) between 2007 and 2012 (2007, 2009, 
2010, 2012). Data collated through the ARs of the sampled IBs were analysed through 
content analysis. The collected data were used in two extensive and detailed indices, which 
were constructed to capture the CG and RM practices of IBs.  
The research is rationalised on the assumption that there is a relationship between CG and 
RM on the ground that good practice concerning RM disclosure should be the result of good 
practice in CG performance. Hence, this study aims to test the hypothesis that there is a 
positive correlation between CG and RM disclosure levels in the IB sector. 
The overall findings of the study reveal two important results: most IBs have poor scores in 
Shari’ah compliance and Shari’ah governance. Poor scores are also revealed in other 
dimensions such as ethics, audit, and b, composition. Risk management, on the other hand, 
depends very highly on reporting and disclosure. Secondly, CG and risk management 
disclosure levels do not have a strong correlation. Thirdly, regression results show that the 
Shari’ah dimension has a very high influence on the CG performance, while reporting and 
risk management control are significant components of the RM disclosure 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review to identify 
the context and the observed gap in the literature, while Section 3 renders a detailed research 
methodology section which summarises the data generation process for CG and RM through 
disclosure analysis. Section 4 presents the descriptive findings on the disclosure performance 
for CG and RM at the bank and country level, while Section 5 presents detailed analysis and 
findings from the CG and RM disclosure performances. Section 6 extends the analysis into 
regression analysis to explore the impact of the individual dimensions on CG and RM 
indices’ scores. Section 7 presents some reflective discussions on the results and Section 8 
brings the paper to a conclusion. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Beyond the prevailing theories on CG, there is another strong fundamental principle that is 
governance related. Disclosure, which hinges on human behaviour, to a certain extent has 
implications on the perception of corporate governance. Although transparency has been 
lobbied pervasively, it is revealed that disclosure is quite a problematic issue and not easy to 
overcome as stressed by (Forker, 2012), the quality of disclosure is quite a concern and being 
debated in the UK.  
Damagum and Chima (2013) divide disclosure into two: mandatory disclosures which are 
statutory disclosure, and voluntary disclosures as information that is in excess of disclosure 
requirements. Similarly, Meek et al. (1995:555) see voluntary disclosures are “representing 
free choices on the part of company management to provide accounting and other 
information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their AR” of which, Damagum 
and Chima (2013:166) views that the voluntary disclosure emanates from the fact that 
financial reports must meet the needs of the various users and be able to serve as a basis for 
investment decisions for the stakeholders. 
The earlier work on disclosure mostly focused on corporations with respect to corporate 
governance. A study by Wallace (1988), for instance, looks at disclosure in terms of their 
mandatory requirements. His study which is based on the characteristics of Hong Kong–listed 
companies shows that the difference in terms of disclosure is affected by culture. Based on 
the scoring of ARs disclosure, he developed a disclosure index of which the outcome reveals 
culture as an important factor that triggers the difference1 between the disclosure levels 
between countries2. Wallace’s (1988) study also provides a basis that firm-specific factors 
help explain the variation in disclosure, besides stressing the role played by the environment 
of financial reporting which speculates on corporate reporting. He mentions that either the 
comprehensiveness of the reporting or the mandatory disclosure affects investors, rather than 
business dealings. He explains that the social aspect of the unification has a chain effect on 
investors through corporate reporting that affects investments.  
Similarly, using the disclosure index which is developed in his research on public-listed 
companies, Owusu-Ansah (1998) investigates the adequacy of disclosure practices on 
 
1 Hong Kong–listed companies provide mandatory information in a comprehensive manner in their ARs 
2 People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong 
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mandatory information by the companies on the African stock exchange. He assesses the 
‘stringency’ of the mandatory disclosure of the regulated companies by the regulatory regime 
of that market and examines the relationship between mandatory disclosure and CG attributes 
such as ownership structure, audit quality, and company age, among others.  
In shifting the focus on corporate accounting, Haniffa, and Cooke’s (2002) study indicates 
that the interaction of environmental factors influences disclosure practices with regards to 
corporate governance. This is in line with a recent study by Darmadi (2011), who examined 
the disclosure level on CG through ARs of IBs. Based on his findings on disclosure, he views 
that board members and risk management aspects are strong while internal controls and board 
committees are weak. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) use content analysis to develop a disclosure 
index to examine companies’ ARs to study the linkages between CG variables. They reveal 
that some firm-specific factors could affect disclosure. They mention the importance of CG 
and cultural characteristics as they highlight that disclosure in ARs (of Malaysian listed 
corporations) could possibly determine the disclosure of the corporations. In their study 
which uses a disclosure approach to examine ethicality disclosure, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2007) use ARs in empirically examining disclosure levels in IBs concerning CG aspects. 
Based on disclosure, the study which analyses the gap between the ideal and communicated 
information from the IBs’ ARs reveals some disparity in the result as far as IBs ethicality is 
concerned.  
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL PROCESS 
As evidenced in recent years, the use of content analysis and its significant issues has been 
discussed by several studies (Beattie, 2005). Content analysis is a widely used method of 
analysis in financial accounting research (Beattie; 2005). Using content analysis in its 
disclosure analysis, this paper examines the relationship of CG-RM based on the information 
provided by IBs through their communication aspect. It utilises secondary data from the 
sample IBs’ ARs to gauge how much information the banks disclosed in relation to best 
practices.   
Based on banks’ best practices, a total of 135 qualifying statements3 are developed (see 
Appendix 2). These qualifying statements, tabulated into worksheets represent the model for 
CG and RM. The worksheet (see Appendix 1) comprises 9 themes which are grouped into 15 
 
3 The qualifying statements are constructs, thus are used interchangeably. 
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dimensions. There are 8 and 7 dimensions with 75 and 60 constructs for CG and RM 
respectively. Thus, any individual bank with an index score of 135 has the highest disclosure 
and vice versa. 
Through the content analysis approach, information from the ARs is scanned and read 
through. The index for the respective CG and RM is constructed based on the information 
that IBs released in their ARs. The information from ARs is mapped against the qualifying 
statements to see whether they are qualified as pertinent information as far as disclosure is 
concerned. The information is tabulated, scored, and recorded in the worksheet.  
A total of 53 IBs4 are taken as a sample to represent different regions. In terms of sampling, 
the IBs are chosen based on the criteria that they; are Islamic financial institutions, published 
ARs in English, have ARs from the specific years as per the research’s requirement. Thus 
from the 53 IBs, the secondary data is obtained from a collection of 182 published ARs over 
4-year period, between 2007, 2009, 20105, and 20126. For IBs that do not have ARs for the 
above specified years, the ARs for the years between 2003 and 2012 are used. It is important 
to note that non-standardization in terms of means of communication affects the efficiency in 
the collection of secondary data. Although most data are obtained from the ARs that are 
published online on the individual IB’s website, analyses on CG and RM are also based on 
data that is compiled from financial statements and risk management reports. Data is also 
compiled from other sources such as IB magazines, online articles, and web-pages to help 
support information gathering.  
As mentioned, this study uses content analysis qualitative research techniques in conducting 
disclosure analysis. Using ARs as its secondary data, the research ensures reliability and 
validity via coding, which is part of the content analysis of which, requires ARs to be read 
with emphasis placed on CG and RM-specific aspects. During the coding process, 
information obtained from the ARs is checked against the construct. If the data can be 
mapped, that means the specific data is disclosed as spelt out by the best practices. 
 
4 See Table 3 for sample banks  
5 ARs for year either 2010 or 2011. 
6 Different IBs have ARs of different years (depending on AR’s availability) although ARs for years 2007, 2009, 
2010, 2012 are preferred. Else IBs with a minimum of 1 and maximum of 4 ARs for years 2003-2012 are 
considered. 
Abdullah, Hanimon & Asutay, Mehmet (2021). “Exploring the Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
Disclosure Performance Nexus in Islamic Banks: An Empirical Analysis”, in T. Azid, M. Mukhlisin, N. Akbar and 
M. Tahir (eds.), Monetary Policy, Islamic Finance, and Islamic Corporate Governance. London: Emerald. 
6 
 
Then the scoring is done of which, each item is scored dichotomously; 1 if present or 0, 
otherwise. The scoring is additive in nature and the index is constructed. based on a weighted 
average, as simplified below: 
Indexj = nj∑t=1Xij/nj        (1) 
where, 
Indexj is the index, nj is the number of constructs disclosed by jth IB, nj<= 1357, and xij =1 if 
ith construct is disclosed (0 if ith construct is not disclosed), so that 0<=Ij <=1.   
This model is identical to the one developed by Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). Generally, an 
index is derived by considering its total score, which is divided by 135 i.e. the total number of 
constructs. The sample mean disclosure for each dimension is derived by summing up the 
index of each individual bank divided by the sample size, which is 53. The scores obtained by 
each IB are recorded in the respective bank’s table (Appendix 2 is used as a template). The 
table shows scores for each year of the ARs (depending on how many ARs each bank has) 
where the bank’s score for each year is added up to give the individual IB its total scores for 
all the years. 
Each IB’s total score is calculated based on the above formula and is split according to the 
dimensions. To derive the ‘Dimension Index’ (D), the score of each dimension is divided 
against the total constructs of that dimension. Then the index is tabulated by taking into 
account the total number of ARs the IB has.  
3.1. Constructing the CG Index 
The construct of CG Index (CGI) is based on the total scores the bank obtains in its 
dimensions from D1 through D8 against the total number of constructs, totalling 75 taking 
into account the number of years (of the ARs). This construct applies to each individual 
sampled bank in each individual sampled country, referred to as the ‘Bank CG Index’. The 
mean Bank CG Index is derived by adding up the CGI for all the banks divided by the 
number of banks.  
The CG index is also constructed for each country, referred to as the ‘Country CG Index’. 
The Country CG Index is constructed based on the total scores of each individual bank 
 
7 Because in the example, three banks are used. 
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obtained for dimensions D1 through D8, considering the number of its ARs. For example, if 
the bank has a 4-year of ARs then all the scores for the 4 years are added up. Then each 
individual bank’s total score is added up giving a country CG score. The country CG score is 
divided by the total number of qualifying statements (which is 75) for x year of AR. This 
means that if there are three banks in the country and each bank has 4-years of ARs then the 
denominator will be 75 multiplied by 38 then multiply by 49 which results in 900.  
The mean Country CG Index is derived by adding up the CGI for all the countries divided by 
the number of countries.   
3.2. Constructing the RM Index  
The RM Index (also is referred to as the Bank RM Index or RMI) is developed based on the 
same formulation as CGI. Except that the total number of QS is 60 for RMI (instead of 75). 
The RMI is constructed based on the total scores the bank obtains in its D9 through D15 
dimensions against the total QS in dimensions D9 through D15, which totals to 60, taking 
into account the number of ARs for the sampled years.  
The RMI is constructed for each bank. The mean Bank RMI is derived by adding up the RMI 
for all the banks divided by the number of banks, which is also constructed for each country, 
referred to as Country RM Index. 
Similar constructs apply to the RM Country Index except that the total QS is 60 instead of 75. 
The Country RM Index is constructed based on the total scores each individual bank obtains 
in dimensions D9 through D15, taking into account the number of years, where if the bank 
has a 4-year series of ARs then all the scores for these 4 years should be added up. This 
construct applies to each individual bank in the country where each individual bank’s total 
score is added up to give a country RM score. The country RM score is divided by the total 
QS (which is 60) for x series of years. This means that if there are 3 banks in the country and 
each bank has a 4-year series of ARs then the denominator will be 60 multiplied by 3 (i.e. 
banks) and 4 (i.e. years) which results in the denominator being 720. The mean Country RM 
Index is derived by adding up the RMI for all the countries divided by the number of 
countries. 
Scale of Disclosure 
 
8 Because in the example, three banks are used.  
9 Because in the example, four years of ARs.   
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Each index is categorised based on a scale from 1 to 0 (1 represents the highest disclosure, 0 
for non-disclosure). The scoring method is in line with a study by Hasan (2011) on Shari’ah 
governance. Thus, this paper should be considered as part of the emerging research by 
expanding the practice of research. The classification for each disclosure index is as follows:  
0.90 <= very high <= 1.0;  
0.70 <= high < 0.90; 
0.60 <= moderate < 0.70;  
0.50 <= low < 0.60 and; 
0 <= very low < 0.50. 
4. DESCRIPTIVE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE DISCLOSURE PERFORMANCE 
Since the objective of this paper is to explore how CG could relate to RM and vice versa in 
terms of relationship, this section aims to provide bank and country-level overall results. This 
section presents the disclosure analysis results for CG and RM, initially, through their 
individual dimensions. The examination of ARs, which is based on 15 dimensions 
compounded by the 9 underlying themes, is done thematically. The findings of CG disclosure 
are discussed based on dimensions (D1-D8) followed by the findings on disclosure of RM 
based on dimensions (D9 - D15). 
4.1. Findings on the CG Disclosure - Overall Results for CGI 
The disclosure performance on CG is estimated initially for each of the CG dimensions. It is 
based on the score of each dimension of CG that the CG index (CGI) is constructed. The 
overall result on CGI at the bank level is presented below, followed by the CGI results of 
disclosure at the country level.  
Bank Level 
The overall findings of the CGI for dimensions at bank level are depicted in Table 1, which 
shows that the mean disclosure for overall CGI is 0.25%, which is unjustifiably low 
considering that CG is the key aspect of the bank’s strategic direction which encompasses the 
overall mission and operations. This is explained somewhat by the fact that CG may have not 
been widely adopted by IBs, and thus disclosure in relation to its principles may not occur in 
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a short period of time.  In addition, the political economies of the countries where IBs operate 
have not essentialised CG as an important structural matter. 
As presented in Table 1, 3 IBs have ‘high’ scores on CGI disclosure. These are ABIB, BIMB, 
and KFH, which score between 0.79 to 0.74. It may imply the existence of a CG structure 
that has been in place and being adhered to by these banks. ABIB and BIMB score very 
highly under the board theme, while KFH demonstrates very high disclosure under the 
Shari’ah theme. 
As can be seen, CIMB, JDIB, and BISB are among the 6 IBs that are classified as having 
‘moderate’ disclosure with a score in the range of 0.66 and 0.60. Despite the ‘very high’ 
disclosure under the board theme, CIMB and JDIB’s performances in overall CGI are just 
moderate due to their very poor scores in Shari’ah compliance and ethics respectively. As for 
BISB, it is consistently moderate in all dimensions but performs comparatively high in 
Shari’ah governance, except for in the audit and ethics dimensions. Ithmaar’s performance in 
disclosure is quite consistent throughout the dimensions except for its relatively low 
disclosure under Shari’ah governance. 
Table 1: Overall Bank Level Results for all the Dimensions 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 0.793 HLIB 0.560 Hilal 0.407 Eskan 0.270 DIB 0.130 
Emirates 
IB 0.070 








Syariah 0.551 ABCIB 0.370 AlRajhi 0.250 Jadwa 0.120 Al-Shamal 0.053 
CIMB 0.667 As-Salam 0.483 BLME 0.340 Meezan 0.233 Shah Jalal 0.120 IBB 0.050 
JDIB 0.633 EIIB 0.467 Capinnova 0.324 Bujr 0.200 Faisal(Sud.) 0.116 AlBaraka (Sud) 0.040 
Bahrain 





0.190 Al-Arafah 0.113 Boubyan 0.030 
RHB 0.610 Affin 0.458 AlJazira 0.300 IIAB 0.187 QIIB 0.107 Tadamon 0.027 




0.293 Al-Falah 0.153 IBQ 0.100 Faisal(Egy) 0.027 
Ithmaar 0.597 Gatehouse 0.407 Alinma 0.271 Rayan 0.137 AlBaraka (Egy) 0.093   
Mean = 0.32 
HLIB, Khaleeji, and BNI Shari’ah are the 3 IBs that have ‘low’ disclosure indices. HLIB’s 
performances in the disclosure are high and quite consistent throughout the dimensions 
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except for disclosure under the Shari’ah theme which is very poor. This is quite similar to 
Khaleeji. As in the case of BNI Shari’ah, its low disclosure results come from Shari’ah 
compliance.   
Banks from the ‘very low’ disclosure index group such as EIIB and Al Baraka demonstrate 
very poor disclosure on Shari’ah compliance. This is not unexpected, as EIIB has to adhere 
to FSA guidelines on top of its compliance list despite being an Islamic institution. Al Baraka 
Turk, on the other hand, does not reveal any disclosure in the Shari’ah dimension. Quite 
interestingly, it is noted that, even though Al Baraka Turk does not reveal its Islamic 
practices in view of it being imposed upon by tentative social pressure, this could also imply 
that observing Islamic practices may possibly act as a detriment that induces negative 
perception towards religiosity in Turkish’s society, hence evidencing very poor disclosure on 
Shari’ah compliance. 
Country Level 
Similar to the bank-wise disclosure, having the mean index disclosure for the overall-country 
index at 0.25% for all the dimensions is very low. As presented in Table 2, there are no 
countries with ‘very high’ disclosure in the CGI dimension. Being in the ‘high’ disclosure 
group in the overall CGI, Malaysia’s top position is contributed by its high scores especially 
in board leadership, board composition, and board meeting dimensions. This reflects very 
high government intervention in the bank’s regulations.  This could be reflected in the form 
of a strict regulatory framework enforced by the government on board-related matters.  
Table 2: Overall Country Level Results for all the Dimensions 
Country Overall CGI Country Overall CGI Country Overall CGI 
Malaysia 0.620 Turkey 0.283 Bangladesh 0.152 
Bahrain 0.520 Saudi 0.233 Sudan 0.065 
Jordan 0.508 UAE 0.216 Egypt 0.060 
Indonesia 0.378 Pakistan 0.196 Kuwait 0.040 
UK 0.303 Qatar 0.166 Yemen 0.027 
Mean: 0.25  
The remaining 10 sampled IB countries or 79% of the sampled countries are considered as 
scoring ‘very low’ in the overall CGI dimension, the scores ranging between 0.45 and 0.05. 
The sample shows that the countries’ mean CGI disclosure is 0.28, which is quite low despite 
many discussions in the literature of its significance. The low CG disclosure is mainly 
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affected by 3 dimensions: Shari’ah compliance, ethics, and Shari’ah governance, all of which 
demonstrate ‘very low’ mean scores of 0.12, 0.17, and 0.28, respectively. The ‘low’ 
disclosure of these dimensions is mainly contributed to by countries such as Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and Qatar, apart from Bangladesh and Turkey. This could possibly indicate quite a 
lax commitment by the governments and the IBs themselves.  
Countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Pakistan demonstrate ‘very 
low’ disclosure in their overall CGIs with the sampled IBs drawn from these countries. In 
general, the banks do not have strict regulatory guidelines that enforce them to work towards 
CG compliance. Saudi Arabia for instance, might not have streamlined directives between the 
regulators thus an implementation of CG best practices may be hard to achieve. As for the 
UK, the disclosure level seems to be quite encouraging despite its strong commitment to 
comply with regulatory bodies such as the FSA first.  
4.2. Findings on the RM Disclosure - Overall Results for RMI 
The disclosure on RM is done initially on each of the RM dimensions. It is based on the score 
of each dimension of RM that the RM index (RMI) is constructed. The overall result on RMI 
at the bank level is presented below, followed by the results on disclosure at the country 
level.  
 
Bank Level   
As shown in Table 3, the modest mean disclosure of 0.57 for overall risk management 
disclosure performance is very much affected by the scores from the banks in the ‘very low’ 
disclosure group. Boubyan, Meezan, Shah Jalal, JDIB, Jadwa, JIB, DIB, Islami Bank, Kuwait 
Int, and BNI Shari’ah are among the 28% (13) of the banks in the ‘very low’ group whose 
scores are in the range 0.45 to 0.01. 
Table 3 shows that only one bank scores ‘very high’ while 17 banks are classified as ‘high’. 
A total of 12 banks have ‘moderate’ scores and the remaining 5 banks indicate ‘low’ scores in 
overall risk management disclosure. Looking at the ‘high’ disclosure index of 0.91, this may 
imply that CIMB and other banks with ‘high’ disclosure, such as BIMB, EIIB, HLIB, ABIB, 
and RHB use disclosure as one of their strategies to increase the banks’ access to capital 
markets. To a certain extent, this may imply that these banks have very strong market 
discipline, hence ‘high’ risk management disclosure is observed in this group. Theoretically, 
disclosure enhances the attractiveness of the banks’ shares to current and prospective 
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investors. Beyond this, investors can reduce their costs of information seeking to pertain to 
the banks.  













CIMB 0.908 Affin 0.789 
KFH 
(Bah.) 0.688 Eskan 0.625 Boubyan 0.446 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 0.300 
BIMB 0.888 BLME 0.779 
Kuveyt 





EIIB 0.883 ABCIB 0.763 
Gatehous





HLIB 0.867 Hilal 0.742 AlJazira 0.671 
Emirates 















Baraka 0.817 AlRajhi 0.725 BISB 0.629 Bujr 0.513 Jadwa 0.333 Al-Shamal 0.054 












(Egy) 0.450 DIB 0.308   
Mean = 0.57 
Banks being categorised in the ‘moderate’, ‘low’, and ‘very low’ risk management disclosure 
groups, whose scores are in the range of 0.69 to 0.60, 0.57 to 0.51, and 0.45 to 0.01 
respectively, may reflect that they are still struggling with the RM structure. The disclosure 
level hinges on the banks’ safety net, as they have to weigh the repercussions of revealing 
proprietary and strategic information to competitors and potential new entrants. This could 
probably be the reason why banks like DIB and JIB have to reform to sustain their strength. 
Country Level  
As far as the banking system is concerned, risk management has always been relevant. 
However, on a country basis, the mean disclosure index of 0.51 in the overall risk 
management is considerably unimpressive considering the pervasive impact risk management 
can impose on the robustness of the financial system. Nevertheless, as frequently mentioned, 
the low mean risk management disclosure index could probably be due to technical 
distortions resulting from the small sample size as well as the limited number of published 
AR. 
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Malaysia 0.864 Qatar 0.572 Yemen 0.400 
Turkey 0.768 UAE 0.568 Egypt 0.375 
UK 0.754 Pakistan 0.531 Kuwait 0.348 
Bahrain 0.690 Bangladesh 0.433 Indonesia 0.212 
Saudi 0.602 Jordan 0.400 Sudan 0.153 
Mean: 0.51 
As far as disclosure is concerned, the extent and nature of RM disclosure relates to how 
‘high’ the risk management structure is put in place. This may imply that countries like 
Malaysia, the UK, Bahrain, and Turkey have ‘high’ disclosure as the country has a long-
established risk management infrastructure in supporting the banks’ operations. On another 
note, the ‘high’ disclosure demonstrated by these banks, to a certain extent, implies that these 
banks undertake rigorous efforts in promoting their banks’ market value as well as improving 
returns, as it is perceived that disclosure has the probability of influencing the banks’ share 
price and their expected stock return. 
It is noted that the banks that score better in risk management disclosure have a supportive 
government in terms of safeguarding the banks’ financial health. Countries like the UK and 
Malaysia for instance, have government safety nets such as deposit insurance in place to 
improve the banks’ risk management. As for countries with ‘moderate’ risk management 
disclosures like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the risk management initiatives started sometime 
later, hence, it does not reflect quite well as of yet. Qatar, UAE and Pakistan score quite 
‘moderate’ in the overall disclosure while Bangladesh, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan and Indonesia 
fall in the ‘very low’ disclosure group in the overall RMI dimension, with scores ranging 
from 0.12 to 0.42. This may imply that these banks need to play more persistent roles in 
undertaking risk management apart from their government’s supportive role to complement 
their efforts. 
From another perspective, the disclosure level is very much affected by its own repercussions 
after the disclosure exercise takes place. It is noted that disclosure affects the risk-taking 
incentives, since the banks will have informed depositors rather than individuals monitoring 
the bank’s balance sheet. In a way, this is considered positive because the banks can control 
their asset volatility and bank failures can be avoided.   
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However, to a certain extent, the presence of informed markets may have effects on the 
banks’ sustainability as disclosure may impinge on the banks’ strategic advantage to potential 
competitors. This could possibly be the reason as to why in some countries banks have yet to 
achieve a certain level of institutional base, as Sudan, Pakistan and Bangladeshi banks seem 
to be adamant in not disclosing very much information. 
5. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE PERFORMANCE 
This paper so far has focused on presenting the descriptive findings through an explorative 
motive and providing further meaning to the results through interpretation. This section aims 
to examine the strength of the relationship between the two variables; CG and RM. In other 
words, while the individual results are presented, this study at the same time, aims to locate 
whether there is any relationship between CGI disclosure and RMI disclosure; because it is 
hypothesised that a better CG environment should result in a better RM practice. In doing so, 
this paper also reveals the strength of the relationship between all the dimensions of CG and 
RM.  
The correlation method is employed to measure the strength of the relationships, which is a 
technique used to examine the relationship between two variables (Pallant, 2010). A 
correlation exists when knowing scores for one variable helps to predict scores for the other. 
In order to establish the nature of the relationships, SPSS is employed of which the Spearman 
Rho tool is used on the same data (sample of 153 AR) to examine the correlations. It should 
be noted that proxies are used to represent each CG and RM. 
The correlation tests in this section are run in both the bank and country comparison cases. 
Thus, the following findings are the outcomes of the tests on two sets of data: bank-wise and 
country-wise for CGI and RMI.  The following sub-section proceeds with the results of the 
findings of the correlation. 
5.1. Correlation between CGI and RMI Performance at Bank-Level and Country-Level 
Based on the correlation tests conducted in the bank comparison analysis, there is a modest 
relationship between CGI and RMI as depicted by the disclosure indices. As can be seen from 
the results, the coefficients are slightly above average; 0.587 using the Spearman Rho based 
analysis in Table 5 and 0.522 in the Pearson based estimation in Table 6. The results evidence 
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that the relation between the two variables, CG and RM, are not incredibly strong as had been 
expected, even though the relationship seems to be significant.  Thus, there is a statistically 
significant relationship as produced by both the estimation period, but the strength of the 
relationship stayed at a medium level. 
Table 5: Bank-Level Spearman’s Rho Correlation between CG and RM Scores 
  CG RM 
Spearman's rho CG Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .587** 




Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b. Listwise N = 53 
Table 6: Bank-Level Pearson Correlation between CG and RM Scores 
  CG RM 
CG 
Pearson Correlation 1 .522** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 
N 53 53 
RM 
Pearson Correlation .522** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
N 53 53 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Similarly, based on the test done on country comparison analysis using the disclosure indices 
developed, there is also a slightly above average correlation between CGI and RMI. Quite 
similar to the results of the bank’s comparison, the country’s result shows a correlation 
coefficient of 0.576 and 0.529 using Spearman Rho (Table 7) and Pearson (Table 8) 
respectively. As before, despite having a significant relationship, these coefficients do not 
indicate any strong relationship. 
Table 7: Country Level Spearman’s Rho Correlation between CG and RM Scores 
  CG RM 
Spearman's rho CG Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .576* 




Sig. (2-tailed) .025   
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Notes: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); b. Listwise N = 15 
 
Table 8: Country-Level Pearson Correlation between CG and RM Scores 
  CG RM 
CG Pearson Correlation 1 .529* 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .042 
RM Pearson Correlation .529* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .042   
Notes: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); b. Listwise N=15 
5.2. Correlations between the CGI Dimensions  
This section proceeds with the results of the findings of the correlation estimation between 
CGI and its dimensions and also between the CGI dimensions. The results are depicted in 
Table 9 and Table 10.  
5.2.1. Correlations between the CGI and its dimensions at bank-level  
Table 9 shows the correlation between CGI and its dimensions. The CGI, which is a proxy of 
corporate governance, has relatively strong correlations with ‘Board composition’ (r = .794, p 
= 0.000); ‘Mission’ (r = .696, p = 0.003); ‘Board leadership’ (r = .686, p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah 
governance’ (r = .674, p = 0.000); ‘Ethical business’ (r = .647, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination 
committee’ (r = .632, p = 0.000). However, CG has quite moderate relationships between 
‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .591, p = 0.000) and ‘Board meeting’ (r = .477, p = 0.000). 
Table 9 also depicts the findings of the test between all other dimensions of CG. As seen 
from results, the correlation between the CG dimensions varies in strength. The ‘Mission’ has 
a correlation with ‘Board composition’ (r = .799, p = 0.000); ‘Ethics’ (r = .671, p = 0.000); 
‘Board leadership’ (r = .625, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .586, p = 0.000); 
‘Board meeting’ (r = .581, p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .444, p = 0.001) and 
‘Shari'ah Compliance’ (r = . 353, p = 0.000). 
As indicated in Table 9, ‘Board composition’ has a correlation with ‘board leadership’(r = 
.831, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .784, p = 0.000); ‘Ethical business’ (r = .682, 
p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .621, p = 0.000); ‘Board meeting’ (r = .538, p = 
0.000) and ‘Shari'ah Compliance’ (r = .471, p = 0.000). 
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It is noted that ‘Board leadership’ is correlated with ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .697, p = 
0.000); ‘Ethical business’ (r = .623, p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah Compliance’ (r = .485, p = 0.000); 
‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .484, p = 0.000) and ‘Board meeting’ (r = .398, p = 0.003). 
As for ‘board meeting’, it is only correlated with only one dimension i.e. the ‘Nomination 
committee’ (r = .566, p = 0.000). Based on Table 9, ‘Nomination committee’ is correlated 
with ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .517, p = 0.000); ‘Ethical business’ (r = .430, p = 0.001) and 
‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .425, p = 0.002).  
Table 9: Correlation Estimations between CGI and Dimensions and between 
Dimensions at Bank-Level 
















CG Cor.Coef 1.000 .696** .794** .686** .477** .632** .674** .591** .647** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Mission Cor.Coef .696** 1.000 .799** .625** .581** .586** .444** .353** .671** 
Sig. .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .010 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Board 
composition 
Cor.Coef .794** .799** 1.000 .831** .538** .784** .621** .471** .682** 
Sig. .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Board 
leadership 
Cor.Coef .686** .625** .831** 1.000 .398** .697** .484** .485** .623** 
Sig. .000 .000 .000  .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Board 
meeting 
Cor.Coef .477** .581** .538** .398** 1.000 .566** .260 .120 .259 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .003  .000 .060 .391 .061 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Nomination 
committee 
Cor.Coef .632** .586** .784** .697** .566** 1.000 .517** .425** .430** 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .002 .001 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Shari’ah 
governance 
Cor.Coef .674** .444** .621** .484** .260 .517** 1.000 .632** .382** 
Sig. .000 .001 .000 .000 .060 .000  .000 .005 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Shari’ah 
compliance 
Cor.Coef .591** .353** .471** .485** .120 .425** .632** 1.000 .377** 
Sig. .000 .010 .000 .000 .391 .002 .000  .005 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Ethical 
business 
Cor.Coef .647** .671** .682** .623** .259 .430** .382** .377** 1.000 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .061 .001 .005 .005  
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Abdullah, Hanimon & Asutay, Mehmet (2021). “Exploring the Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
Disclosure Performance Nexus in Islamic Banks: An Empirical Analysis”, in T. Azid, M. Mukhlisin, N. Akbar and 




Table 9 also shows that ‘Shari’ah governance’ has slightly above average correlation with 
‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .632, p = 0.000) but very poor relationship with ‘Ethical business’ 
(r = .382, p = 0.005). The dimension ‘Shari’ah compliance’ seems to have a very weak 
correlation with ‘Ethical business’ (r = .377, p = 0.005). 
 
5.2.2. Correlations between the CGI and its dimensions at country-level 
Table 10 shows the correlation estimations country-wise. As can be seen, there are slightly 
weaker correlations between CG and its dimensions as compared to the results of the bank-
wise dataset. The CG has a strong correlation with ‘Board composition’ (r = .962, p = 0.000); 
‘Board leadership’ (r = .950, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .897, p = 0.000); 
‘Ethical business’ (r = .822, p = 0.000) and ‘Mission’ (r = .806, p = 0.000). CG also has a 
correlation with ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .732, p = 0.002); ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = 
.680, p = 0.005) and ‘Board meeting’ (r = .595, p = 0.019). 
Apart from the above relationships, as shown in Table 10, relationships between the CG 
dimensions are also observed. It seems that ‘Mission’ is highly correlated with ‘Board 
composition’ (r = .873, p = 0.000); ‘Board meeting’ (r = .793, p = 0.000); ‘Board leadership’ 
(r = .760, p = 0.001); and ‘Ethical business’ (r = .742, p = 0.002). There are also correlations 
with the ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .597, p = 0.019); ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .461, p = 
0.002); and ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .420, p = 0.005). 
Table 10 also shows that ‘Board composition’ is highly correlated with ‘Board leadership’ (r 
= .943, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .838, p = 0.000); and ‘Ethical business’ (r = 
.759, p = 0.001) while its correlations are slightly above average with  ‘Board meeting’ (r = 
.691, p = 0.004); ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .656, p = 0.008); and ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = 
.588, p = 0.021). 
As indicated in Table 10, the ‘Board leadership’ is highly correlated with the ‘Nomination 
committee’ (r = .869, p = 0.000) and ‘Ethical business’ (r = .790, p = 0.000). The ‘Board 
leadership’ relationships are above average with ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .669, p = 0.006); 
‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .669, p = 0.006) and ‘Board meeting’ (r = .507, p = 0.054). 
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It is also observed that the variable ‘Nomination committee’ is quite strongly correlated with 
‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .697, p = 0.004); ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .688, p = 0.005) and 
slightly above average with ‘Ethical business’ (r = .599, p = 0.018), 
As shown in Table 10, ‘Shari’ah governance’ is highly correlated with ‘Shari’ah compliance’ 
(r = .798, p = 0.000). The table below also indicates a very modest relationship between 
‘Shari’ah compliance’ and ‘Ethical business’ (r = .505, p = 0.055).  
Table 10: Correlation Estimations between CGI and Dimensions and between 
Dimensions at Country-Level 


















1.000 .806** .962** .950** .595* .897** .732** .680** .822** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .019 .000 .002 .005 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Mission Cor. 
Coef 
.806** 1.000 .873** .760** .793** .597* .461 .420 .742** 
Sig. .000  .000 .001 .000 .019 .084 .119 .002 





.962** .873** 1.000 .943** .691** .838** .656** .588* .759** 
Sig. .000 .000  .000 .004 .000 .008 .021 .001 





.950** .760** .943** 1.000 .507 .869** .669** .669** .790** 
Sig. .000 .001 .000  .054 .000 .006 .006 .000 





.595* .793** .691** .507 1.000 .459 .438 .157 .464 
Sig. .019 .000 .004 .054  .085 .103 .577 .082 





.897** .597* .838** .869** .459 1.000 .697** .688** .599* 
Sig. .000 .019 .000 .000 .085  .004 .005 .018 





.732** .461 .656** .669** .438 .697** 1.000 .798** .483 
Sig. .002 .084 .008 .006 .103 .004  .000 .068 





.680** .420 .588* .669** .157 .688** .798** 1.000 .505 
Sig. .005 .119 .021 .006 .577 .005 .000  .055 





.822** .742** .759** .790** .464 .599* .483 .505 1.000 
Sig. .000 .002 .001 .000 .082 .018 .068 .055  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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5.3. Correlations between Risk Management and its Dimensions 
This section proceeds with the results of the findings of RM correlation as depicted in Table 
11 and Table 12. 
5.3.1. Correlations between the RMI and dimensions at bank-level  
The results in Table 11 show that there are positive correlations between RMI and its 
dimensions. The proxy of RMI has slightly above average correlations with ‘Risk 
management control’ (r = .684, p = 0.000); ‘Risk management committee’ (r = .676, p = 
0.000) and ‘Reporting’ (r = .654, p = 0.000). However, it is observed that the correlation is 
just about moderate between RM and ‘Credit risk’ (r = .544, p = 0.000); ‘Audit’ (r = .540, p 
= 0.000); ‘Market and liquidity risk’ (r = .461, p = 0.001) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .421, p = 
0.002). 
Table 11 also shows the strength of the relationships between dimensions in the RM group. 
There are positive correlations between various RM dimensions. Based on the table, modest 
relationships are observed between RM and its dimensions. ‘Audit’ is not strongly correlated 
with ‘Risk management control’ (r = .465, p = 0.000); ‘Risk management committee’ (r = 
.449, p = 0.001); ‘Reporting’ (r = .434, p = 0.001) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .289, p = 0.036). As 
for the variable ‘Risk management committee’, Table 11 also indicates that it is correlated 
with ‘Risk management control’ (r = .688, p = 0.000); ‘Reporting’ (r = .590, p = 0.000); 
‘Credit risk’ (r = .585, p = 0.000); ‘Market & liquidity risk’ (r = .522, p = 0.000) and ‘Other 
risk’ (r = .444, p = 0.001).  
The table also indicates that ‘ Risk management control’ has correlations with ‘Credit risk’ (r 
= .646, p = 0.000); ‘Reporting’ (r = .616, p = 0.000); ‘Market & liquidity risk’ (r = .558, p = 
0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .533, p = 0.000). As for ‘Reporting’, it has quite strong 
correlation with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .741, p = 0.000), ‘Market & liquidity risk’ (r = .650, p = 
0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .608, p = 0.000).  
This is quite similar to ‘Market & liquidity risk’ which has strong, positive correlations with 
‘Credit risk’ (r = .875, p = 0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .729, p = 0.000). Table 11 also shows 
that ‘Credit risk’ has a strong, positive correlation with ‘Other risk’ (r = .842, p = 0.000). 
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Table 11: Correlation Estimations between RMI and Dimensions and between 
Dimensions at Bank-Level 















RM Cor.Coef 1.000 .540** .676** .684** .654** .461** .544** .421** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .002 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Audit Cor.Coef .540** 1.000 .449** .465** .434** .105 .200 .289* 
Sig. .000  .001 .000 .001 .454 .151 .036 




Cor.Coef .676** .449** 1.000 .688** .590** .522** .585** .444** 
Sig. .000 .001  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 




Cor.Coef .684** .465** .688** 1.000 .616** .558** .646** .533** 
Sig. .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Reporting Cor.Coef .654** .434** .590** .616** 1.000 .650** .741** .608** 
Sig. .000 .001 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Market & 
liquidity risk 
Cor.Coef .461** .105 .522** .558** .650** 1.000 .875** .729** 
Sig. .001 .454 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Credit risk Cor.Coef .544** .200 .585** .646** .741** .875** 1.000 .842** 
Sig. .000 .151 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Other risks Cor.Coef .421** .289* .444** .533** .608** .729** .842** 1.000 
Sig. .002 .036 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
5.3.2. Correlations between the RMI and dimensions at country-level  
The correlation estimates in Table 12 show positive correlations between risk management 
and its dimensions. The RM has strong, positive correlations with ‘Risk management control’ 
(r = .928, p = 0.000); ‘Reporting’ (r = .905, p = 0.000); ‘Risk management committee’ (r = 
.878, p = 0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .714, p = 0.003). The RM also has slightly above 
average correlations with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .680, p = 0.005); ‘Audit’ (r = .668, p = 0.006) and 
‘Market & liquidity risk’ (r = .644, p = 0.010).  
Table 12 also shows the relationships between the RMI dimensions. It is noted that ‘Audit’ 
has positive correlations with ‘Risk management committee’ (r = .710, p = 0.003); ‘Risk 
management control’ (r = .561, p = 0.030) and ‘Reporting’ (r = .524, p = 0.045). Based on 
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Table 12, the variable ‘Risk management committee’ is correlated with ‘Reporting’ (r = .843, 
p = 0.000); ‘Risk management control’ (r = .799, p = 0.000); ‘Other risk’ (r = .530, p = 
0.042) and ‘Credit risk’ (r = .522, p = 0.046).  
Table 12: Correlation Estimations between RMI and Dimensions and between 
Dimensions at Country Level 















RM Cor.Coef 1.000 .668** .878** .928** .905** .644** .680** .714** 
Sig.  .006 .000 .000 .000 .010 .005 .003 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Audit Cor.Coef .668** 1.000 .710** .561* .524* .116 .109 .254 
Sig. .006  .003 .030 .045 .680 .699 .360 




Cor.Coef .878** .710** 1.000 .799** .843** .460 .522* .530* 
Sig. .000 .003  .000 .000 .084 .046 .042 




Cor.Coef .928** .561* .799** 1.000 .767** .640* .663** .614* 
Sig. .000 .030 .000  .001 .010 .007 .015 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Reporting Cor.Coef .905** .524* .843** .767** 1.000 .622* .686** .664** 
Sig. .000 .045 .000 .001  .013 .005 .007 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Market & 
Liquidity risk 
Cor.Coef .644** .116 .460 .640* .622* 1.000 .962** .925** 
Sig. .010 .680 .084 .010 .013  .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Credit risk Cor.Coef .680** .109 .522* .663** .686** .962** 1.000 .914** 
Sig. .005 .699 .046 .007 .005 .000  .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Other risks Cor.Coef .714** .254 .530* .614* .664** .925** .914** 1.000 
Sig. .003 .360 .042 .015 .007 .000 .000  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 12 also shows that ‘Risk management control’ has positive correlations with 
‘Reporting’ (r = .767, p = 0.001); ‘Credit risk’ (r = .663, p = 0.007); ‘Market & liquidity risk’ 
(r = .640, p = 0.010) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .614, p = 0.015). The variable ‘Reporting’ has 
moderate positive correlations with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .686, p = 0.005); ‘Other risk’ (r = .664, 
p = 0.007) and ‘Market & liquidity risk’(r = .622, p = 0.013). As indicated in Table 12, 
‘Market & liquidity risk’ has very strong positive correlations with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .962, p = 
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0.000) as well as ‘Other risk’ (r = .925, p = 0.000). As for the ‘Credit risk’, it has a very 
strong positive correlation with ‘other risk’ (r = .914, p = 0.000). 
5.4. Summary on the Correlations Analysis 
Based on the means shown in the results, the disclosure approach highlights that the board-
related dimensions are the most important element in CG. This is evidenced both in banks as 
well as in country comparisons, as shown in Table 13, which summarises the findings. 
Maybe this could be explained by the fact that good board composition and effective 
leadership provide the strength to charter the direction of the IBs. The dimensions ‘risk 
management (control)’, ‘risk management committee’, and ‘reporting’ seem to be 
comparatively more important than other dimensions of risk management.  
Table 13: Correlations Results based on Disclosure Approach 
 Bank Comparison Significant Level 
(Standard 
coefficient) 
Country Comparison Significant Level 
(Standard 
coefficient) 
CG Board composition .794 (0.000) Board composition .962(0.000) 
 Mission .696 (0.003) Board leadership .950 (0.000) 
 Board leadership .686 (0.000) Nomination & 
remuneration committee   
.897 (0.000) 
 Shari’ah governance .674 (0.000) Ethics .822 (0.000) 
 Ethics .647 (0.000) Mission .806 (0.000) 
 Nomination & 
remuneration committee 
.632 (0.000) Shari’ah governance .732 (0.002) 
 Shari’ah compliance .591 (0.000) Shari’ah compliance .680 (0.005) 
 Board meeting .477 (0.000) Board meeting .595 (0.019) 
RM Risk management control .684 (0.000) Risk management control .928 (0.000) 
 Risk management 
committee 
.676 (0.000) Reporting .905 (0.000) 
 Reporting .654 (0.000) Risk management 
committee 
.878 (0.000) 
 Credit risk .544 (0.000) Other risk .714 (0.003) 
 Audit .540 (0.000) Credit risk .680 (0.005) 
 Market & liquidity risk .461 (0.001) Audit .668 (0.006) 
 Other risk .421 (0.002) Market & liquidity risk .644 (0.010) 
 
The analysis in this section shows all the possible relationships between CGI and RMI based 
on correlation analysis that is employed on data for both bank and country comparisons. It is 
observed that the strength of the relationship between CG and RM is just slightly above 
average. It is also noted that some of the dimensions of CG and RM have very strong 
relationships with each other. Perhaps this could be the reason why in many instances, CG 
and RM seem to be discussed interchangeably.  
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The correlation analysis in this section is aimed at examining the relationships among the 
dimensions (i.e. two dimensions at a time), based on the respective CG and RM frameworks. 
The analysis is pursued to further investigate the inter-relationship between CG and RM. This 
is carried out through regression analysis in the following section. 
6. EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF THE INDIVIDUAL DIMENSIONS ON CGI AND 
RMI PERFORMANCE: REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
In identifying which variables have a greater effect on the dependent variable with the 
objective of both substantiating the findings from descriptive and correlation analyses so far 
present, a further investigation of the inter-relationship between CG and RM is carried out 
through regression analysis. It should be noted that regression analysis as a statistical method 
is about describing and evaluating the relationship between a given variable and one (or 
more) variables to explain movements in a variable by reference to movements in other 
variables (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2008).  
This section aims to find out the effect of each dimension of CGI through regression analysis. 
Similarly, the same approach applies to finding the effects on RMI. The findings are based on 
the test conducted on the banks’ comparison. 
The regression model in equation 2 is formulated by taking the dimensions of CG as the 
independent variables to explain the dependent variable, CGI. 
CG = α1 + β1mission + β2boardcomposition + β3boardleadership + β4boardmeeting + 
β5nominationcommittee + β6shariahgov + β7shariahcompliance + β8ethicalbusiness + ε1  
           (2) 
Based on the proposed model, there are 8 dimensions that determine the CGI score. 
Similarly, a regression model is formulated where RMI is regressed against its dimensions as 
shown in the regression equation 3: 
RM = α2 + β1riskmgtcommittee + β2riskmgtpractice + β3riskmtdisclosure + β4reporting + 
β5marketliqrisk + β6creditrisk + β7otherrisks + ε2     (3) 
where CG: corporate governance; RM: risk management; α1 and α2 are constants; ε1 and ε2 = 
error terms.  
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The models use CGI and RMI as the respective dependent variables, while their respective 
dimensions are the independent variables. Based on equation 1, CG is a function of CG’s 
dimensions (which are the explanatory variables). 
6.1. Regression Results for CGI 
This section employs multiple regression analysis to measure the determinants of CGI 
through the secondary data obtained from the AR.  
Table 14: Model Summary of the Regression Analysis for CG for IBs 






1 .883a .780 .740 .113608 
Notes: a. Predictors: (Constant), ethicalbusiness, boardmeeting, Shari’ahgovernance, 
Shari’ahcompliance, boardleadership, nominationcommittee, mission, boardcomposition 
Based on the model summary (Table 14), the adjusted R-Square or the coefficient of 
determination is quite close to the perfect model with about 74%. Thus, the model presented 
in this study explains about 74% of the variations observed in the dependent variable, which 
is quite highly satisfactory.  
The result of the adjusted R2 is verified by the results provided through ANOVA (Table 15), 
as dividing the regression sum of squares by the total sum of squares, the same adjusted R 
result is obtained. 






Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.010 8 .251 19.471 .000b 
Residual .568 44 .013     
Total 2.578 52       
Notes: a. Dependent Variable: cg; b. Predictors: (Constant), ethicalbusiness, boardmeeting, 
Shari’ahgovernance, Shari’ahcompliance, boardleadership, nominationcommittee, mission, 
boardcomposition 
Table 15 also indicates that ANOVA analysis produced highly significant results as the 
models were fully significant. 
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t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
 (Constant) .026 .036  .725 .472 
Mission .060 .101 .091 .596 .555 
Boardcomposition .188 .141 .285 1.332 .190 
Boardleadership -.002 .075 -.003 -.022 .983 
Boardmeeting .075 .061 .133 1.220 .229 
Nominationcommittee .032 .083 .053 .385 .702 
Shari’ahgovernance .167 .099 .174 1.691 .098 
Shariahcompliance .335 .094 .360 3.559 .001 
ethicalbusiness .067 .100 .079 .673 .504 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: CG 
Table 16 provides the coefficient estimates for the models mentioned through the path 
analysis by using the multiple linear regression method. As depicted, the model has only one 
dimension, ‘Shari’ah compliance’ with a coefficient value of 36.0 and p-value of 0.001, 
which is found to be statistically significant. Indeed ‘Shari’ah governance’ is also found to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. The remaining dimensions: 
‘mission’, ‘board composition’, ‘board leadership’, ‘board meeting’, ‘nomination and 
remuneration committee’, and ‘ethical business’ were found to be not statistically significant 
based on the analysis. Having ‘Shari’ah governance’ statistically significant is indeed an 
important conclusion for IBs. 
6.2. Regression Results for RM 
Similarly, the study measured determining variables of RMI through the same set of 
secondary data by employing the multiple regression analysis. Table 17 provides a model 
summary where the adjusted R2 or the coefficient of determination was quite close to the 
perfect model with about 69%. Thus, the model presented in this study explains about 69% of 
the variation observed in the dependent variable, which is quite highly satisfactory.  
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Table 17: Model Summary of the regression analysis for RM for IBs 
Model Summary 






1 .855a .731 .689 .127805 
Notes: a. Predictors: (Constant), otherrisks, audit, riskmgtcommittee, reporting, riskmgtcontrol, 
marketliqrisk, creditrisk 
The result of the adjusted R2 is verified by the results provided through ANOVA as shown in 
Table 18, as by dividing the regression sum of squares by the total sum of squares, the same 
adjusted R result is obtained. The table indicates that ANOVA analysis produced highly 
significant results as the models were fully significant. 
Table 18: ANOVAa for RM for IBs 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.993 7 .285 17.431 .000b 
Residual .735 45 .016     
Total 2.728 52       
Notes: a. Dependent Variable: rm; b. Predictors: (Constant), otherrisks, audit, riskmgtcommittee, 
reporting, riskmgtcontrol, marketliqrisk, creditrisk 
Table 19 provides the coefficient estimates for the models mentioned through the path 
analysis by using the multiple linear regression method. As depicted, the model has only two 
dimensions: ‘reporting’ and ‘risk management control’ with both variables being statically 
significant with a coefficient value of 0.52 with p-value of 0.001 and 0.31 with p-value of 
0.027. The remaining dimensions: ‘audit’, ‘risk management committee’, ‘risk management 
control’, market and liquidity risk’, ‘credit risk’, and ‘other risks’ are not significant based on 
the analysis. It should be noted that ‘market and liquidity risks’ and ‘credit risk’ variables are 
not statistically significant, but they do have a negative relationship with the dependent 
variable. As the results show, ‘reporting’ and ‘risk management control’, being significant 
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1 (Constant) .097 .058   1.667 .102 -.020 .214 
audit .142 .110 .130 1.299 .201 -.078 .363 
riskmgtcommittee .071 .073 .120 .962 .341 -.077 .219 
riskmgtcontrol .203 .088 .312 2.291 .027 .025 .381 
reporting .396 .108 .520 3.668 .001 .179 .614 
marketliqrisk -.059 .118 -.090 -.504 .617 -.296 .178 
creditrisk -.018 .168 -.025 -.105 .917 -.356 .321 
otherrisks .016 .130 .021 .121 .904 -.247 .278 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: rm 
Since one of the objectives is to determine which aspect of CG has the strongest influence on 
the overall CG, the actual dimensions which affect CG and RM the most are established. This 
study reveals that the Shari’ah-related dimension has the highest bearing on the overall CG 
position. The findings of the research show that all the CG dimensions have positive effects 
on CG apart from board leadership, which has a negative effect. However, only two variables 
have significant effects on CG: Shari’ah governance’ (at the 10% significance level) and 
‘Shari’ah compliance’ (at the 5% significance level).  
Risk management, on the other hand, depends very highly on reporting and disclosure. All 
RM’s dimensions have a positive effect on RM apart from ‘market risk’ and ‘credit risk’, 
which have a negative effect. Similar to CG, only two variables have significant effects on 
RM: ‘reporting’ and ‘risk management control’, at the 5% significance level. 
7. REFLECTIONS ON THE RESULTS  
This paper presented extensive analysis on various levels to determine the CGI and RMI 
relationship through 2 main methods. First, the correlation between the relationship within 
and between CG and RM themselves are determined. Secondly, in an attempt to determine 
the most effective dimension having an impact on CG and RM respectively, a regression 
analysis is undertaken to conclude the analysis. 
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The overall findings of the study reveal two important results:  CG and risk management do 
not have a strong correlation between them. However, in examining the type of relationship, 
it is established that there is a positive relationship between CG and RM.  
The findings confirm the hypotheses which state that ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and ‘Shari’ah 
governance’ are the key determinants of ICG while ‘reporting’ and ‘risk management 
control’ are the key factors in RM. 
The descriptive empirical findings show that most IBs have very poor scores in Shari’ah 
compliance and Shari’ah governance. Poor scores are also revealed in other dimensions such 
as ethics, audit, and board composition. 
The preceding section reveals that most banks do not have the same level of disclosure for 
both their CG and RM. In general banks’ CG level is always lower than their RM’s 
disclosure level. However, there are cases when some banks do attain higher disclosure in CG 
than in RM. This could probably be due to the IBs’ lack of professional skills in risk 
management practices (Hassan and Dicle, 2005).    
In general, the CG disclosures for banks are highly influenced by board-related areas such as 
‘board composition’ and ‘board leadership. In a similar vein, viewing CG as a crucial task for 
the strategic management of the bank, Maingot and Zeghal (2008) perceive the disclosure of 
CG as highly dependent on bank size. From their analysis, larger banks have higher 
disclosure. In addition to that, Pathan (2009) posits limited boards positively affect bank risk-
taking.   
Most of the banks in the ‘low’ and ‘very low’ CG disclosure groups have ‘very low’ 
disclosure in the ‘board’ dimension. This is consistent with Eng and Mak (2003), who view 
that disclosure is influenced by the board as ownership structure and board composition all 
affect disclosure levels.  
In general, irrespective of their disclosure groups, the banks have a poor score in Shari’ah-
related and ‘ethics’ dimensions. Quite often, the ‘high’ RM disclosure is attributed to the key 
risk management area. It is also noted that most banks in the ‘moderate’, ‘low’, and ‘very 
low’ RM disclosure groups have comparatively low scores in the ‘audit’ dimension as 
opposed to the key risk management area.  
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The findings also reveal that even if the bank’s CG and RM are in the same disclosure group, 
the mean for CG tends to be lower than the mean for RM10. In terms of the number of banks, 
the ‘low’ and ‘very low’ CG disclosure groups have more banks as compared to the similar 
disclosure groups of RM. Similarly, there are fewer banks in the ‘high’ and ‘moderate’ CG 
disclosure groups compared to their RM counterparts, of which, the latter has quite a 
balanced number in each disclosure category11.  
Based on the country comparison, it is found that the majority of the countries under survey 
are still weak in terms of their CG. As such, ‘moderate12’ is the highest CG disclosure 
obtained despite the Islamic moral economy’s essentialisation of ‘good Islamic governance’ 
based on Islamic norms. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that as theory and evidence suggest, disclosure facilitates 
opening up a company’s access to capital markets, makes their shares more attractive to 
current and prospective investors by reducing information-gathering costs (Bhimani, 2009). 
Thus, not only Islamic CG principles are not essentialised, the financial values of these 
institutions may have affected by their low disclosure scores. To expand on this, RM 
disclosure helps reveal how effective their RM is, while CG plays a subtler role (Bhat, 2008). 
Based on the analysis using the bank comparison data, it is found that not all dimensions have 
a high effect on CG and RM. The correlation between the dimension ‘board composition’ has 
the highest correlation (0.794) with CG. The dimension ‘mission’ (0.696), ‘board leadership’ 
(0.686), ‘Shari’ah governance’ (0.676), the ‘ethical business’ (0.647) and ‘nomination 
committee (0.632) dimensions also denote high correlations with CG. ‘Shari’ah compliance’ 
(0.591) and ‘board meeting’ (0.477) however, do not seem to impose a great impact on CG. 
The findings reflect that board composition is very crucial as it helps IBs to effectively steer 
the banks; their effectiveness has a high influence on CG (John and Senbet, 1998). This is to 
 
10 For example, ABIB and BIMB have both their CG and RM in the ‘high’ disclosure group but the mean for 
their CG (0.793 and 0.767 respectively) are lower than the RM’s (0.858 and 0.888 respectively). 
11 The findings show that CG has only 3 banks in the ‘high’ disclosure group as compared to RM which has 17 
banks in the same disclosure classification. There are 5 banks in the ‘moderate’ CG disclosure group as 
compared to 12 banks in the same level of disclosure for RM. The findings reveal that the majority of the banks 
(41) are in the ‘very low’ CG disclosure group as opposed to only 18 banks in the same levels of disclosure for 
RM.  
12 Only one country obtains ‘moderate’ disclosure. The remaining 14 countries have ‘low’ disclosure of which 
12 of them have very ‘low’ disclosure. As opposed to RM, 3 countries have ‘high’ disclosure, followed by 2 
countries which account for ‘moderate’ while 10 countries are in the ‘low’ disclosure group of which 7 of them 
have ‘very low’ disclosure. 
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ensure a mix of skills and expertise to govern effectively (Edwards and Clough, 2005). The 
dimension ‘mission’, ‘board leadership’, ‘Shari’ah governance’, ‘ethical business’, and 
‘nomination committee’ dimensions are also perceived as important. The ‘mission’ is seen as 
very significant as it represents the starting point from which banks collectively agree on the 
organisational goals and objectives (Cohen et al., 2010). This is in contrast with a study by 
Aebi et al. (2012), which claims that a shared understanding of CG generally does not have to 
be in the shareholders’ best interests. As for the dimensions ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and 
‘Board meeting’, they do not seem to have a great impact on CG.  
With correlation being employed to analyse risk management’s dimensions, the findings 
reveal that the dimensions ‘risk management control’ (0.684), ‘risk management committee’ 
(0.676), and ‘reporting’ (0.654) have a great impact on RM. As for other dimensions such as 
‘credit risk’ (0.544), audit’ (0.540), ‘market liquidity risk’ (0.461), and ‘other risks’ (0.421), 
they have about an average impact on RM. 
The findings reveal that ‘risk management control’, ‘risk management committee,’ and 
‘reporting’ are crucial for RM. Perhaps the high score on ‘risk management control’ can be 
explained by a study on the determinant of bank risk-taking by Anderson and Fraser’s (2000), 
which examines managerial ownership’s impact on risk-taking, states that the management, 
rather than the shareholders, are the ones responsible for setting the bank’s risk structure.    
The dimension ‘credit risk’, surprisingly, is not highly correlated with CG. This is quite in 
contrast with Switzer and Wang’s (2013) study, which mentions that CG and ‘credit risk’ are 
significantly associated. ‘Audit’, ‘market and liquidity risk’, and ‘other risks’ are perceived to 
have mild effects on RM. 
Table 20: Summaring Results 
 Disclosure Analysis Significant Level (Standard 
coefficient) 
CG Shari’ah compliance 0.001 (36%) 
 Shari’ah governance 0.098 (17.4%) 
 Board Leadership Not significant, negative relationship 
RM Reporting & disclosure 0.001 (52%) 
 Risk management control 0.027 (31.2%) 
 Market & liquidity risk Not significant, negative relationship 
 Credit risk Not significant, negative relationship 
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The results of the regression analysis demonstrate that not all dimensions have a high effect 
on CG and RM. As summarised in Table 20, the regression analysis results based on the 
disclosure approach show that ‘Shari'ah compliance’ and ‘Shari'ah governance’ are 
statistically significant. They explain 36% and 17.4% respectively. It should be noted that the 
‘board leadership’ dimension has a negative relationship with CG. Similarly, for risk 
management, when the same tool is used to examine the RM dimensions, the ‘reporting and 
disclosure’ and ‘risk management control’ are significant; explaining 52% and 31.2% of the 
RM while the other dimensions do not indicate any significance on RM. The ‘market and 
liquidity risk’ and ‘credit risk’ indicate a negative relationship with RM. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Having presented and discussed the empirical results following the comparison conducted at 
the bank - and country-levels to identify CG-RM relationships, it is found that the 
performance of CGI is comparatively lower than that of the RMI’s, both bank-wise and 
country-wise. It is also found that the overall CGI mean and RMI mean country-wise is 
slightly lower compared to the ones bank-wise. 
In an attempt to locate the relationship between CG and RM practices through disclosure 
approach, this study found that the relationship between CG and risk management is not 
incredibly strong in the case of the IB involved during the period that this study covers. Thus, 
bringing in bank failures issues into perspective, based on the fact that a positive relationship 
exists between the two, if CG is said to be the triggering factor, this could also partly due to 
the risk management aspect.  
Nonetheless, still in the context of the financial crises, when CG is blamed, this should not 
necessarily be attributed to risk management, as the latter does not necessarily affect CG 
despite being correlated. 
However, moving forward, as this study is predicated on the notion that if banks have high 
CG disclosure, the disclosure of risk management should similarly be high. Hence, as 
expected, good CG practices should moderate risk exposure and establish an effective risk 
management process. Further research is expected to bring in more reflections on the issues 
of CG and RM which should be a primary focus for the robust and consolidated development 
of the IBs. 
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Appendix 1: Dimensions in Disclosure Index for CG and RM 




Composition of the BOD 9 
Board Leadership 3 
Board Meetings 2 
Nomination Committee or / and Compensation Committee 11 
Shari’ah Governance 12 
Shari’ah Compliance 18 
Ethical Business Conduct & Corporate Responsibility 13 
 Sub-total 75 
Risk  
Management 
Audit Committee 22 
Risk Management Committee or / and Asset Liquidity Committee 6 
Risk Management, Control Items & Risk Disclosures 10 
Reporting - Accounting and Funding 9 
Market and Liquidity Risks 6 
Credit Risks 5 
Other Risks 2 
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Category No Questions Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
Mission 
1 The text of the board’s written mandate is described.     
2 
The bank has a clear statement of the leadership, 
purpose, mission and values with reference to 
corporate governance. 
    
3 The annual statement contains statement addressing corporate governance.     
4 Reference is made to widely accept corporate governance principles.       
5 Assessment is made regarding current compliance (where relevant) with the mentioned CG principles.     
6 
Clear statement of the stakeholders’ engagement on 
corporate governance issues and processes is 
provided. 
    
7 
Communication policy for promoting effective 
communication with shareholders to encourage their 
participation is disclosed. 
    
Composition of 
the Board of 
Directors 
8 Identity of the chairman is provided (such as independent or non-executive, etc.).     
9 Profile of chairman is disclosed (qualification and experience).     
10 Proportions of non-executive members or proportions of independent members are provided.     
11 The identity of each director whether he/she is independent or non-executive is disclosed.     
12 Profile of each board member is disclosed (qualification, experience etc.).     
13 A leadership statement on how the board operates is disclosed.     
14 The Board member’s formally assigned individual’s responsibilities outside the bank are provided.     
15 
Statement on whether or not the board and its 
committees are regularly assessed with respect to 
their effectiveness and contribution is provided. 
    
16 
If assessments are regularly conducted, the process 
used for the assessments is described OR if 
assessments are not regularly conducted, statements 
on how the board satisfies itself (whether its members 
and committees are performing effectively) are 
described. 
    
Board 
Leadership 17 
Reference to transparent and responsive process for 
evaluating performance of senior management is 
provided. 
    
  18 The way the board delineates its role and responsibilities is described.     
Bank: 
Region: 
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  19 
How the board facilitates its exercise of independent 
judgment in carrying out its responsibilities is 
disclosed. 
    
Board Meetings 20 The number or frequency of the meetings is disclosed.     
  21 Members’ attendance at meetings is disclosed.     
Nomination 




22 Committee size is disclosed.     
23 Identity of the chairperson is disclosed whether he is independent or non-executive.     
24 Profile of the chairperson is disclosed such as qualification, experience etc.     
25 Profile of each board member is disclosed.     
26 
Whether or not the board has a compensation 
committee composed entirely of independent 
directors is disclosed. 
    
27 The proportion of independent members or non-executive members is disclosed.     
28 The process by which the board identifies new candidates for board nomination is described.     
29 
The process by which the board determines the 
compensation for the bank’s directors and 
management is described. 
    
30 
If the board has standing committees other than the 
audit, compensation & nominating committees, the 
committees and their functions are disclosed. 
    
31 Number of meetings held during the year is disclosed.     
32 Attendance of each member’s committee meetings is disclosed.     
Shariah 
Governance 
33 Statement on the endorsed conformity of Shariah compliance is disclosed.     
34 Shariah supervisor structure is disclosed.     
35 The board size is disclosed.     
36 Identity of the chairman of the Shariah board is disclosed (experience, qualification etc.).     
37 
The chairman of the Shariah board whether he is 
independent or non-executive chairperson is 
disclosed. 
    
38 Whether other Shariah supervisory board members are independent or non-executive are disclosed.     
39 Qualification and relevant experience of all Shariah board are disclosed.     
40 Formally assigned individual’s responsibilities of the board (outside the bank) are disclosed.     
41 
How the Shariah board facilitates its exercise of 
independent judgment in carrying out its 
responsibilities is disclosed. 
    
42 Policies and procedures on appointment and dismissal of members are described.     
43 Number of meetings during the year is disclosed.     
44 Members’ attendance at meetings is disclosed.     
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45 Mechanism on Shariah compliance monitoring is disclosed.     
46 Treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shariah is provided.     
47 Sources and uses of zakah and charity funds are disclosed.     
48 Method of zakah calculation is disclosed.     
49 The contractual rights of investment account holders are disclosed.     
50 Investment and asset allocation strategies are provided.     
51 Rights and liabilities of IAH in the event of liquidation are disclosed.     
52 Statement on the mechanics of smoothing the returns by the bank is provided.     
53 Notes related to the utilization of profit equalization ratio (PER) is provided.     
54 Notes related to the utilization of investment risk reserves (IRR) is provided.     
55 The treatment for the distribution of PER in the event of liquidation is disclosed.     
56 The profit calculation method and its share of profit earned attributable to IAH are disclosed.     
57 Changes to policy with regards to profit calculation is provided.     
58 Changes to policy with regards to investment and asset allocation strategies is provided.     
59 Change to policy with regards to smoothing of returns     
60 Legal right due to unrestricted IAH pertaining comingled funds is disclosed     
61 Legal right due to unrestricted IAH pertaining Mudharib’s failure is disclosed.     
62 
A report on appropriateness of Shariah basis of 
allocation of profit between equity holders and IAH 
is provided. 





63 The code of ethics for the directors adopted by the board is disclosed.     
64 
If the board has adopted a written code, how a person 
or company may obtain a copy of the code is 
disclosed. 
    
65 
How the board monitors compliance with its code is 
disclosed OR if the board does not monitor 
compliance, how the board satisfies itself regarding 
compliance with its code is described. 
    
66 
Any steps the board takes to ensure directors exercise 
independent judgment in considering transactions and 
agreements in respect of which a director or 
executive management have a material interest are 
described. 
    
67 
Any other step the board takes to encourage and 
promote a culture of ethical business conduct is 
described. 
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68 Mechanism protecting the rights of shareholders is disclosed.     
69 Policy and performance in connection with environmental and social responsibility is provided.     
70 Waivers to the ethics code are disclosed.     
71 Code of ethics for all employees is provided.     
72 Role of employees in corporate governance is provided.     
73 Performance evaluation process is disclosed.     
74 Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on bank’s sustainability is disclosed.     
75 Policy on whistle blower protection for all employees is provided.     
Audit 
Committee 
76 Committee size is disclosed.     
77 Identity of the chairperson is disclosed.     
78 Whether the chairperson is independent or non-executive is disclosed.     
79 Whether or not the board composed entirely of independent directors is disclosed      
80 Proportion of independent members is disclosed.     
81 Whether committee members include non–executive director is disclosed.     
82 The process by which the board identifies new candidates for board nomination is described.     
83 The terms of reference of the committee is formed and approved by the board     
84 Scope of work and responsibilities is disclosed.     
85 Term of reference of internal audit is disclosed.     
86 Board’s confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors is provided.     
87 Process of appointment of external auditor is disclosed.     
88 Process for interaction with external auditor is disclosed.     
89 Duration of current external auditors is disclosed.     
90 Rotation of audit partners is disclosed.     
91 Proportion of audit/other fees is disclosed.     
92 Number of meetings held during the year is disclosed.     
93 Attendance of each member’s committee meetings is disclosed.     
94 The suitability of internal audit is provided (based on experience and qualification)     
95 The internal audit is said to be conversant with policies and procedures of the bank.     
96 The effectiveness of IA is stated.     
97 Related party transactions are placed before audit committee and approved by the board.     
Risk Mgt 98 The board provides risk management oversight.     
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99 Full board is accountable and responsible for overall risk.     
100 Clear-defined mandate to continuously regulate risk activity is provided.     
101 Other board risk committees are formed.     
102 Other board committees are also involved in risk oversight.     






104 Bank’s risk management organization is disclosed.     
105 Senior management commitment in risk management is provided.     
106 Risk management framework is disclosed      
107 The top emerging risks that arise from the bank’s business models and activities are discussed.     
108 The bank’s risk terminology is provided.     
109 The bank’s strategies or procedures are described.     
110 The bank’s risk culture or its risk appetite is described.     
111 The use of stress testing or other measures is described.     
112 How the bank plans to meet regulatory ratios is provided.     
113 
All risk information is presented together in a report 
OR a navigator index to locate the risk disclosure in 
the reports is provided. 




114 The bank has an understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting.     
115 The board’s accountability of the financial statements is disclosed.     
116 Statement of accounting in compliance in accordance to IFRS.     
117 Statement on transparency and disclosure is provided     
118 Statement stressing on Comprehensiveness of Policies and procedures  is provided.     
119 Assets tabulated in balance sheet categories which include collateral received are provided.     
120 
Consolidated total assets, liabilities and off-balance 
sheet commitments by the remaining contractual 
maturity at the balance sheet date are presented. 
    
121 
A narrative discussion of management’s approach to 
determine the behavioural characteristics of financial 
assets and liabilities is provided. 
    
122 The bank’s funding strategy, including key sources and any funding concentrations is discussed.     
Market & 
Liquidity Risks 
123 How market liquidity is considered is disclosed.     
124 How bank manages its liquidity needs is described.     
125 The linkages between line items in balance sheet and income statement are provided.     
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126 
Qualitative and quantitative breakdowns of 
significant trading and non-trading market risk 
factors that may be relevant to the bank’s portfolio 
are provided. 
    
127 
Qualitative and quantitative disclosures that described 
significant market risk are provided (such as 
measurement, model limitations, assumptions, 
validation procedures, use of proxies, changes in risk 
measures and models through time). 
    
128 
The primary risk management techniques to measure 
and assess the risk of loss beyond reported risk 
measures and parameters are described (such as VaR, 
earnings or economic value scenario results through 
methods such as stress tests, expected shortfall, 
economic capital, scenario analysis, stressed VaR or 
other alternative approaches). 
    
Credit Risk 
129 
Information on the bank’s credit risk profile which 
includes any significant risk concentration is 
provided. 
    
130 Policies for identifying impaired loans are described.     
131 Reconciliation of the opening and closing balances of impaired loans are provided.     
132 
A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the bank’s 
counterparty risks that arises from its derivatives 
transactions is provided. 
    
133 Qualitative information on credit risk mitigation is provided.     
Other Risks 
134 Other risks types identified by the management are described.     
135 How they are identified, governed, measured and managed is disclosed.     
 
